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Changes in the use of Dutch doen and the nature of semantic
knowledge
Arie Verhagen
1. Introduction1
Addressing the topic oido/doenltw in English, Dutch and German in itself already poses
an important conceptual problem. We assurae that in some sense we are talking about
the same element, but on the other hand, of course, the reason for making such a small
element a topic of discussion at all is that its use over different languages and different
periods shows large amounts of Variation. What should an analysis which aims at
accounting for unity and diversity simultaneously, then look like? In this paper, I will
propose a particular type of answer to this general question by reviewing some
theoretical consequences of an analysis of a specific issue, viz. that of changes in the use
of causative doen in Dutch over the last three centuries. Empirically, this is only a small
portion of the entire area defined by the general topic, but conceptually the Situation in
this relatively small area gives rise to exactly the same paradox äs the one I just men-
tioned - and because ofthat, its solution can also be assigned wider significance.
In section 2,1 will first describe the semantics and pragmatics of the causative use
ofdoen, on the basis of earlier work (especially Verhagen and Kemmer 1997), establish-
ing a strong correlation between the use of doen and inanimacy of the causer of the
event described. Section 3 describes changes in this correlation over the last three hun-
dred years in two different dimensions: the first is the fact that animate causers were
used much more frequently with doen in the eighteenth Century, the second is that the
pattern of change differs for different text types. The changes involved are seen äs re-
lating to more general cultural changes: diminished importance of authoriry in narrated
events on the one hand, and increased use of personal perspective in modern narrative
on the other.
Section 4 examines the theoretical implications of these findings for the notion
"knowledge of meaning". The analyses presented imply that in one important sense the
meaning of the element doen is the same now äs it was three hundred years ago, while
on the other hand it has also changed in certain respects. It is argued that in order to
accommodate such a description, knowledge of meaning must be assumed to consist of
Ί am grateful to Nienke Landre" for sharing her data with me, and for assistance in the initial
classification (see the description of the material in section 3.1).
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knowledge of a network of related uses; this is the way that unity and diversity can
simultaneously be accounted for. Some further consequences of this view, äs well äs
contrary ideas, will be discussed.
2. Causative doen
The word doen/do is used causatively when it is combined with a non-finite form of
another verb to indicate that the state or process denoted by the latter is somehow caused
by the referent of the subject of do (which may therefore be called the causer of the
event). This usage has apparently been present in the Western Germanic languages since
early times. The OED (s.v. do, IV:905) describes causative do in the following way:
22. With obj. and infin. (the obj. being logical subject of the iniin.): To make or
cause a person, etc., to do something [...] e.g. "he did them come". to do him
die: to cause or make him die, to put him to death. Obs. or arch.
Two examples, from the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries respectively, are:2
(1) 1154 O.E. Chmn. an 1140, I>e biscop of Wincestre... dide heom cumen bider
(2) 1460 CAPGRAVE Chron. 264 The Kyng... ded his officeres arestin... his uncil
the Duke of Gloucestir.
As the OED indicates, causative do no longer exists in English. In Dutch, however, it has
been present from the oldest records on (see the Middelnederlandsch Woordenboek,
Verwijs and Verdam 1885-1952), to the present day. Some twentieth-century examples3
are given in (3)-(7):
(3) De stralende zon doet de temperatuur oplopen
"The bright sun makes [lit: does] the temperature rise"
2The youngest example given by the OED is from 1828, but even if this is correct, it does not
mean that the causative use of do was general in English at the time. I am not making any Claims
here about the actual development in English; I only want to indicate that this usage is an
originally Germanic one.
3The examples in this section are taken from the Eindhoven Corpus, which was used for the
analysis of the causal verbs doen and loten in modern Dutch reported in Verhagen and Kemmer
(1997), and from newspaper texts in which I happened to encounter some illuminating instances,
such äs (5). For the dÜachronic study reported here, a separate set of data was collected; this
material is described in section 3.1 below.
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(4) Een blik op de voorste rij, waar zijn voorgangers gezeten waren, deed de
nieuwe PvdA-voorzitter beseifen dat hij het niet gemakkelijk zou krijgen
"A glance at the first row, where bis predecessors were seated, made [lit.: did]
the new leader of the Labour Party realize that his Job was not going to be
easy"
(5) CDA doet problemen "paars" even vergeten (Newspaper headline NRC, August
20, 1994)
"The Christian Democratic Party makes [lit: does] (one/people) briefly forget
the problems of the purple coalition [i.e.: the coalition of liberals and social
democrats]"
(6) Zij smeekte Jezus, haar de goede weg te doen bewandelen
"She begged Jesus to make [lit: do] her walk in the right path"
(7) De regering stelt zieh voor deze herstructurering gefaseerd te doen plaatsvinden
"The government intends to have [lit: do] this reorganization take place in
stages".
Note that the first three of these instances contain inanimate causers. The sun in (3) is
a physical cause, and the glance at the first row in (4) is clearly also an inanimate, non-
intentional cause. Example (5) is interesting in this respect, because collective organis-
ations and institutions such äs political parties are easily regarded äs intentional entities
(on a par with individual humans in that respect), but what is meant here is the general,
highly chaotic, Situation of the Dutch Christian Democratic Party making observers
forget that the coalition of liberals and social-democrats has its problems äs well; with
no intention on the part of the CDA, the party is an inanimate causer here. It is with this
type of causation, with an inanimate, non-intentional cause, that doen is most commonly
used, and intuitively feit to be completely appropriate.
This does not mean, however, that doen never occurs with animate causers: the
causers in (6) and (7) must definitely be taken äs animate, intentional ones. However,
this combination is less frequent and also feit to be less usual, at least when the
sentences are considered out of context (I will retum to these cases in section 3.2 below).
In any case, the causal verb commonly found with animate causers is loten, rather than
doen. Dutch loten has a wider sphere of use than English let, äs it ranges from
permissive causation äs in (8), via intermediate cases such äs (9), to coercive causation
äs in (10):
(8) De agent liet hen passeren
"The policeman let them pass"
(9) Zij liet de agent haar rijbewijs zien
"She showed [lit.: let see] the policeman her driver's license"
(10) De Sergeant liet ons door de modder kruipen
"The Sergeant had/made [lit.: let] us crawl through the mud".
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Quantitatively, the relationship between loten and animacy of the causer is rather strong
in modern Dutch. In constructions involving a causer äs well äs an explicit causee,4 only
1% of the instances of loten has an inanimate causer, äs against 58% of the instances of
causative doen (cf. Verhagen and Kemmer 1997:65, Table 1).
Verhagen and Kemmer (1997) propose to explain this distribution in terms of a
combination of two ideas. One is the hypothesis that doen categorizes an event äs in-
volving "direct causation", while loten indicates "indirect causation", where "indirect"
is to be taken äs meaning that there is some other force, besides the causer of the entire
event, which is involved more directly in producing the effect: in (8)-(10) these other
forces are the more or less autonomous activities of the causees that most directly pro-
duce the eifects of (respectively) passing, seeing the license, and crawling through the
mud. Doen, on the other hand, presents an event in such a way that the causer's activity
produces the efFect itself, without an intermediary (more or less autonomous) force.
The second idea is that of Talmy's model of relationships between animacy and
causation types (cf. Talmy 1976, 1988; Croft 1991:167). People usually think in terms
of a naive dualism, involving the world of animate beings on the one hand, and the
inanimate5 world on the other, which have distinct causal properties but can be connected
in particular ways. Within the inanimate world, causes are normally thought of äs
producing their results directly, so when the sun shines brightly the temperature
inevitably rises; this type of causation is indicated by means ofdoen (cf. example (3)).
Within the animate world, on the other hand, causal relations are normally thought of
äs indirect, since no mind can cause a change in another mind directly; this type of
causation — involving, in one way or another, communication between humans — is
indicated by means of loten.
Tuming to interactions between the animate and the inanimate world, causation irom
a source in the inanimate world to a target in someone's mind is an event involving
perception; since perception is a kind of process that has a physical (non-intentional)
cause producing an inevitable result, it is usually indicated in Dutch by means ofdoen
(cf. examples (4) and (5)). Finally, causation irom the animate world to a result in the
inanimate world can in principle be considered direct äs well äs indirect, but will most
often turn out to be categorized äs indirect, äs someone's actions are the intermediary
all causatives have to specify a causee: when the verb indicating the result is itself
transitive, the only participants mentioned are often the causer and the object of the result-
predicate. An example from modern Dutch is (5), and the phenomenon is also mentioned by the
OED for English; in fact, this pattem occurs quite generally cross-linguistically (see also Kemmer
and Verhagen 1994).
5Talmy and others use the term "physical" for the opposite of "mental", but the relevant
distinction (determining causal properties) should be animate vs. inanimate. Perceptions or
behaviour are not naturally taken äs physical causes per se, but they share causal properties with
physical forces in being inanimate; äs we shall see, this is the property that is linguistically
relevant in Dutch.
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between (mental) intention and (physical) result, or some physical force is itself the most
immediate causal factor.6 For example, when I intentionally remove the plug irom the
tub, I let the bath-water flow away, because another force, in this case gravity,7 produces
the actual result most immediately.
3. Changes in usage: two asymmetries
All in all, there is a Strang correlation of animacy of the causer with loten, and another,
though somewhat less strong, correlation of zwanimacy with doen. One immediate conse-
quence of this analysis is that it provides the basis for understanding the greater general
frequency οι loten äs cornpared to doen: most discourse happens to be about activities
and interactions of humans. However, this has not always been the general distribution:
äs recently äs two or three hundred years ago, doen was much more frequent than it is
nowadays, while there are no compelling reasons to believe that language users did not
talk and write äs much about humans then äs they tend to do now. So the above analysis
faces the problem of how it can accommodate such diachronic Variation. An additional
complication - i.e. a constraint on such an accommodation - is that there has not been
a general decline in the use ofdoen; rather, there seem to have been asymmetries in the
development, and I will mention two of them here which I will call the authority factor
(section 3.2) and the text type factor (section 3.3).8 But first I will describe the data used
for this study.
3.7. Material
The material used here was originally collected for a comparison of the use of the two
Dutch causative verbs, doen äs well äs loten, over the last three hundred years (Landre
1993, Verhagen forthc.). Apart from the requirement of being sufficiently comparable
across the Centimes, two other major demands that the material had to meet were, firstly,
that there should be enough instances of both doen and loten to allow for reliable conclu-
sions about changes within the set of usage types of each verb, and secondly, that the
total amount oftext material considered should be large enough to allow for equally reli-
able conclusions äs to possible factors related to such changes. To meet these require-
6The use of doen for causal events of this type emphasizes some non-communicative aspect
of the event, äs in Zij deden een dreigende verklaring uitgaan ("They issued [lit.: did go out] a
threatening Statement"); cf. Verhagen and Kemmer (1997:77).
7Or, in an pre-Newtonian, Aristotelian, world-view: the water's inherent downward tendency.
Interestingly, this shift is not really consequential for the naive typology of causation.
8For more details of the account, see Verhagen (forthc.)
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ments, instances of (causative) doen and loten were collected frorn a number of different
texte,9 two-thirds fictional prose and one-third non-fiction (the complete list of texte used
is given in the appendix); the motivation for this distribution was that in this way, a suf-
ficient variety of causal situations could be expected to be represented in the material.
For each causal verb for each Century, 75 instances of use were collected. The total
amount of text that had to be searched in order to reach this number of instances for
each verb in each Century was about 120,000 words (with a significant exception for
doen in the twentieth Century: a much larger amount oftext had to be searched in order
to collect enough instances of this verb). Therefore, the frequencies of use were norma-
lized to absolute numbers per 120,000 words, and these normalized frequencies formed
the basis for the quantitative analysis, thus also for the tables to be presented below.
3.2. The authority factor
The first asymmetry in the development ofdoen involves animacy. Even impressionistic-
ally, it is obvious that eighteenth-century texte contain many more cases of causative
doen with animate causers than modern texte. Two typical examples (the first from a
non-fictional text, the second from a fictional one) are:
(11) [...] dog dat Sijn Hoogheydt nogtans in dese wel gedaan hadde, omme alvorens
sijn opstel aan de Raidpensionaris te doen zien
"[...] but that His Highness had nevertheless done well in this case, in first
showing [lit: to do see] his document to the Counsellor"
(12) [...]; en ik poogde myn kinderen te doen begrypen, dat zy ook genoeg zouden
hebten, indien zy hun begeerten vroeg leerden beteugelen
"[...]; and I tried to make [lit.: do] my children understand that they would also
be satisfied if they learned to control their desires early".
A comparison of the frequencies (i.e. numbers of instances per 120,000 words, see
section 3.1) reveals the following pattern:
'There is considerable Variation among the texts, in each Century, äs to the number of causal
verbs they contain. Section 3.3 shows that different text rypes exhibit partly different developments
in at least one respect, so it might very well be that more detailed consideration of the texts would
reveal an even greater dependency of the mechanisms of change on the specifics of each text.
However, that would not change the general argument presented here (particularly in section 4),
on the contrary.
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eighteenth Century
twentieth Century
animate
54 (60%)
10 (22%)
inanimate
35 (40%)
34 (78%)
totd
89 (100%)
44 (100%)
Table l. Animacy ofcausers with doen in the eighteenth and twentieth centwies.
The difference in the distribution clearly shows the asymmetry. Animate causers consti-
tuted a considerable majority in the eighteenth Century: examples like (11) and (12) are
not at all uncornmon; but such cases now make up not even a quarter of the entire set
of ifoew-instances. And it is particularly striking that while in absolute terms the number
of animate causers with doen has dropped dramatically, the number of inanimate causers
has not diminished at all.
In Verhagen and Kemrner (1997) an additional feature is proposed beyond the ones
mentioned above (section 2) in order to account for certain variations within modern Stan-
dard Dutch. Briefly, this involves the idea that motivation for categorizing an event äs
involving direct causation may also come from the causer having so much power or
authority that the result can be considered inevitable; a possible intermediary force, even
if present, can then be said to be inconsequential, i.e. not relevant for assigning the event
to a particular type of causation, and thus doen may be justified. This is the explanation
required for examples (6) and (7) (mentioned in section 2, but not yet analysed there):
(6) Zij smeekte Jezus, haar de goede weg te doen bewandelen
"She begged Jesus to make [lit.: do] her take the right path"
(7) De regering stelt zieh voor deze herstructurering gefaseerd te doen plaatsvinden
"The government intends to have [lit.: do] this reorganization take place in
stages".
In (6), the request is not that Jesus commimicate with the main clause subject referent
("She"), but rather that He directly interfere with her mind, and He is presented äs
having the power to do so. Example (7) is from a Statement by the government itself,
presenting its own activity äs sufficient for producing the result indicated.
These considerations give rise to the hypothesis that one should look for the factor
"authority" in the historical texts analysed äs a possible explanation for the Variation
observed. Therefore, within the set of animate causers mentioned in Table l, so-called
institutional authorities were counted: persons identifiable fiOm the immediate contexts
(essentially: paragraphs) äs government officials, äs belonging to the aristocracy, or äs
having a high military rank, äs well äs lawyers or doctors when professional (i.e. legal
or medical) issues were the matter, and parents when the causees were children. For
example, (11) provides an example of the causer being a prince, and (12) of the causer
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being a parent, in this case the mother.10 This count was done for all animate causers of
all causative constructions in the text, including doen äs well äs loten. The results are
given in Table 2 below. The main tendency clearly is a general decrease in frequency
of authorities äs causers: more than half of all animate causers in the eighteenth Century
are authorities, against only 15% in the twentieth Century. Therefore, what appears to
have been going on with respect to causative doen is that its frequency has decreased
over the last three centuries largely because the frequency of an important motivating
factor has decreased (though not disappeared completely). The overall reduction of
authority-causers has mainly been realised in a reduction of dbew-causatives with such
causers (it should be noted that I have only counted authorities which are recognizable
äs such in the irnmediate context), and understandably so, given the strong connection
between authority of the causer and inevitability of the result. As is evident from Table
l, the frequency ofdoen with inanimate causers has in fact remained the same. Thus the
point simply appears to be that nowadays authority is no longer an important aspect of
interpersonal relationships, at least not in the way we talk and write about thern, and this
is what apparently accounts for the lower frequency of causative doen.11
eighteenth Century
(laten+doen)
- doen
twentieth Century
(laten+doeri)
- doen
animate causers
122
54
63
10
proportion of
authorities
63 (=51%)
40 (=74%)
10 (=15%)
4 (=40%)
Table 2. Authority of animate causers in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.
10Tlie famous novel Sara Burgerhart (1782) by Betje Wolffand Aagje Deken is a rieh source
of examples of this type, precisely because issues of educating young people, and especially young
women, so äs to find their proper place in society constitute a major part of its subject matter.
"Note that Table 2 also shows that the other causative construction, with loten, has not really
"taken over" from doen, at least not generally. Rather, what appears to have happened is that in
circumstances similar to those in which doen used to be employed, Dutch Speakers nowadays make
greater use of lexical verbs, for example zeggen ("say"), verteilen ("teil") or meedelen ("inforrn"),
which do not categorize the event äs involving a specific type of causation. Other possibilities are
not excluded either.
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3.3. The text typefactor
The other asymmetry I want to point out concerns a disproportionate development in the
ratios between doen and loten in different text types. Tables 3 and 4 present these ratios
in fiction on the one hand, and in non-fiction on the other (for ease of comparison, the
frequency of loten in the eighteenth Century for each text type is set at 100). The differ-
ence is obvious: the decrease ofdoen is much larger in non-fiction than it is in fiction:
eighteenth Century
twentieth Century
doen : loten =
doen : loten —
108 : 100
80 : 98
Table 3. Development o/"doen/laten ratio in fiction.
eighteenth Century
twentieth Century
doen : loten =
doen : loten =
173 : 100
16 : 60
Table 4. Development of doen/laten ratio in non-fiction.
In the previous section we have seen that the frequency ofdoen with animate causers
decreased drastically. We have also seen that its frequency with inanimate causers
remained constant. This means that the relative proportion of causative doen with inani-
mate causers has become substantially larger. So we should be looking for something
special about that subset that can explain why it should occur especially in fiction, in
fact so much so that it may partly compensate for the reduction of doen with animate
causers. Furthermore, it seems obvious that we should then look especially at events
involving an animate causee, äs these are much more likely to play an important role in
narratives than purely physical events of the type exemplified in (3) ("The bright sun
makes the temperature rise").
To see what is special about an event with an inanimate causer producing some effect
in an animate being, we must consider what someone must be assumed to know when
reading or writing about such an event. This is effectively conceptualizing a report from
inside a person's mind, so the conceptualizer must have access to this other mind. In
other words, saying that something caused a particular mental or emotional state in a
person, creates an internalised, personal perspective. Some examples (from the fictional
texts used for this study) are:
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(13) [...;] zij [= zijn herinneringen] kwamen hem 's avonds gezelschap houden en
deden hem lachen of somber voor zieh uit Staren
"[...;] they [= his memories] came at night to keep him Company and made
[lit: did] him laugh, or gloomily stare in front of him"
(14) Eerst waren het angst en pijn die hem huilen deden, ...
"At first it was fear and pain that made [lit.: did] him cry, ..."
(l 5) Een poort naar niets en voor niemand, in geen enkel opzicht geschikt haar een
gevoel van triomf te bezorgen, of te doen denken dat hij alleen voor haar
gebouwd was
"A gate to nothing and for nobody, in no way fit for giving her a feeling of
triumph, or for making [doing] her think that it was built just for her".
Such cases evoke a character's subjective point of view, and therefore they do not really
fit into a purely objective report. Another example is (4), repeated here for convenience:
(4) Een blik op de voorste rij, waar zijn voorgangers gezeten waren, deed de
nieuwe PvdA-voorzitter beseffen dat hij het niet gemakkelijk zou krijgen.
"A glance at the first row, where his predecessors were seated, made [lit: did]
the new leader of the Labour Party realize that his Job was not going to be
easy".
When we encounter a sentence like this in a newspaper article, we immediately know
that it is not a front page news report; instead, we identify it äs a background story, in
which personal points of view and involvement are allowed. So it seems natural to
expect this particular type of usage to occur relatively frequently in fiction, more often
than in non-fiction.12 Table 5 contains the figures indicating the number of instances
evoking such a personal perspective, with respect to the doen cases referred to in Tables
3 and 4:
I2In her study on the use ofdoen and loten in three medieval Dutch epic poems, Lo-Fo-Wong
(1997) observes that many of these cases would strictly speaking have to be classified äs "inducive
causation" in the typology of Talmy (cf. the discussion of "naive dualism" in section 2 above),
since causers such äs memories and fear (cf. (13) and (14)) are mental rather than physical
phenomena. It is particularly interesting to look at such cases äs they constitute a type that is
entirely absent from the medieval texts studied. Lo-Fo-Wong suggests that this would be
understandable on the basis of a specifically mechanistic view of the causes of mental events
within the individual, in the twentieth Century: causes of the type cited are uncontrollable ones
according to the folk model of the mind (D'Andrade 1987), which is a property they share with
physical causes (cf. note 5). This hypothesis makes it very interesting to look for the ways in
which intemal mental events actually were described in the medieval texts. This point makes no
difference for the present argument, which depends on the internal perspective of the causee.
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Fiction
Non-
fiction
eighteenth Century
twentieth Century
eighteenth Century
twentieth Century
doen
108
80
173
16
personal
perspective
26 (24%)
3713 (46%)
14 (8%)
4 (24%)
Table 5. Frequency of doen with personal perspective.
There is indeed an asymmetry here: the use of doen for perspectivized reports is be-
coming relatively more frequent, and especially so in fiction. More importantly, it is in
fiction that even the absolute frequency of this way of using doen has increased between
the eighteenth and the twentieth Centimes (frorn 26 to 37). In the present-day fictional
texts analysed, almost half of the instances (37 out of 80) of causative doen is accounted
for by this type of use, exemplified in (13)-(15), äs opposed to only a quarter (26 out
of 108 cases) in the eighteenth-century texts. I therefore want to suggest that this change
in the use ofdoen is related to the rise of a subjecü've, personal perspective14 in modern
narrative, of which the so-called free indirect style is the best known manifestation. So
what we have here is another cultural change, now providing motivation for an increase
of the frequency ofdoen in a particular type oftext.
4. Meaning and usage-based networks
The two sets of considerations presented above have some important theoretical conse-
quences, which need to be looked at in more detail. The way the asymmetries have been
presented so far might suggest that what has changed over the last three centuries is not
the meaning ofdoen, but the culture, i.e. in these cases: prevalent views in society about
the role of authority in personal interactions, and certain narrative conventions. In other
words: it seems äs if we could say that the circumstances providing motivation for the
use of the linguistic element doen have changed, but not the meaning of this element
"itself.
However, such a Statement, simple though it may seem, would lead to serious con-
13Sixteen of these instances contain the verbal combination doen denken aan ("make think of',
"remind of).
14To be precise, the notion of "subjective perspective" involved here is that of a chcrccter's
perspective, äs opposed to the subjective perspective of the writer (and/or reader) of the text, i.e.
the "Γ and "you" in the communicative Situation (cf. Sanders 1994:65, and elsewhere). The latter
type of subjectivity actually is less usual in fiction nowadays than it used to be.
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ceptual problems, äs it presupposes a sharp conceptual distinction between "knowing the
meaning of doeri" and "knowing when to use doen". But the criterion of knowing the
meaning of the word doen consists, of course, in the ability to use it adequately in appro-
priate circumstances, and in that sense our eighteenth-century ancestors knew other
things about doen than we do today. Furthennore, the meaning of a word is generally
learned from its being used, not from explications of its meaning, and since the uses in
the eighteenth and in the twentieth centuries differ, the conclusion seems unavoidable
that in some respects people do not learn the same things when they leam the meaning
of doen at the end of the twentieth Century than when they learned it two or three
centuries earlier.
What we need in Order to overcome this paradox is a way of conceptualizing
meaning that allows us to specify, without internal contradiction, in what sense the
meaning of doen may have changed, and in what sense it has not. It is here that I
believe that Langacker's notion of usage-based linguistic description is particularly
helpful (Langacker 1988, forthc.).
Consider a linguistic usage event involving a particular word. To a person for whom
this word is a new element, all that can be known about its meaning is that it is
apparently compatible with this usage event, and so all kinds of perceived features of
this event may be associated with tiiat word. Upon encountering the word another time,
the Situation will not be completely identical. The language user will therefore have to
abstract some aspect of the Situation similar to the first one, in such a way that this
might account for the use of the same word; the use of the same word invites the recog-
nition of similariry between the situations of its use, and by the same token this similar-
ity, abstracted from the usage events, is associated with this particular word. This in ef-
fect amounts to the creation of a (structured) category, symbolized by the word in ques-
tion. We can represent the similarity of the members of the category äs a Schema
abstracted from the usage events; at the same time, these events (the category members
encountered so far, so to speak) can be seen äs instantiating, or elaborating, the Schema,
and thus äs categorized by the Schema. This is what is represented at the top of Figure
l (see the next page). Crucially, the construction of the generalizing Schema does not
have to lead to elimination of memory traces from the specific usage events.
It is natural to assume that the similarity between two usage events involving the
same element will normally be maximized. As experience accumulates, new events are
assimilated to previous ones that are similar in äs many respects äs possible, and äs a
consequence, the (re)occurrence of usage events that share many features gives rise to
particular subschemas (Langacker 1988:139-140). Such subschemas (äs the generalized
memory effects of similar usage events) bear the same kind of relationship to more gen-
eral Schemas äs the memory trace of a single usage event to a Schema. Thus, a category
symbolized by a word will usually consist of a network of more specific and more gen-
eral Schemas, i.e. with a number of levels and "groupings", äs indicated schematically
in Figure 2 on the page below.
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Figure 1. The elementay structure of acategory network
Figure 2. A schematic network, with higher and lower level generdizations
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When the procedure just sketched is repeated on more occasions, a new Situation will
often be considered äs a complete instantiation of an already established schema, so that
it will not lead to further abstraction of similarities, but to entrenchment of the sub-
schema categorizing those instances, increasing its salience (ease of being activated on
a particular occasion of use; Langacker 1988:138-140). A particular subschema may thus
acquire the Status of prototype, äs having the highest degree of salience. This relationship
is depicted in the lower half of Figure 1; the bold line of the prototype box is meant to
indicate its relatively high salience (note that the structure of the relationships is exactly
parallel to the one involving Schemas and usage events). Other usage events may be
considered äs extensions with respect to a prototype, but they are still subsumed under
the same category, äs sufficient similarity to other usage events is recognized to justify
this categorization. Since salience (ease of activation) is a matter of degree, there can be
several Schemas in a network with different degrees of salience; this is what is indicated
by the difference in "boldness" of the lines in Figure 2.
In this conception of structured categories, memory traces of usage events are not
"erased" when a schema is abstracted from them that generalizes over these events (sets
of usage types). So knowing the meaning of a word involves not just knowing the most
general semantic schema for this word; it involves knowing the network of both abstract
and more detailed representations of experience with that word. Using the English verb
run äs his example, Langacker formulates this idea äs follows:
A strict reductionist approach would seek maximum economy by positing only
a single structure to represent the meaning of a lexical category. However, if our goal
is to properly characterize a Speaker's knowledge of linguistic convention, any such
account is unworkable. From neither the category prototype alone, nor from an all-
subsuming superschema (should there be one), is it possible to predict the exact array
of extended or specialized values conventionally associated with a lexeme (out of all
those values that are cognitively plausible). A Speaker must learn specifically, for
instance, that run is predicated of people, animals, engines, water, hosiery, noses, and
candidates for political office; the conventions of English might well be different.
Equally deficient is the atomistic approach of treating the individual senses äs distinct
and unrelated lexical items. The claim of massive homonymy implied by such an
analysis is simply unwarranted - it is not by accident, but rather by virtue of
intuitively-evident semantic relationships, that the meanings are symbolized by the
same form. (Langacker 1988:135-6)
As mentioned above, different parts of a category network may have different degrees
of salience. Sometimes, or for certain Speakers, all-subsuming abstract Schemas will be
virtually non-existent, or they are only created ad hoc. In other cases, certain "sections"
of a network may be absent for one Speaker but not for another (e.g. because they have
not been learned by a Speaker, or a particular group of Speakers), while the Overall struc-
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ture of the networks for the element involved may still be sufficiently similar to allow
communication to take place rather eifortlessly in many situations. And when necessary,
language users may rearrange parts of their network for an element, or add sections to
it, in order to arrive at mutual understanding - a task much less difficult with partially
similar networks in place, than without any similarly structured knowledge of meaning.
This kind of flexibility is precisely what makes the usage-based conception so
useful.15 For example, it is the kind of representation that makes it possible to say that
in an important sense English let and Dutch loten have the same meaning up to a certain
point.16 In the same vein, this is the kind of meaning conception that we need in order
to be able to say that doen is the same word when used in causative constructions äs
when used, for example, anaphorically or periphrastically; we can construct a link from
"performing some action" to both "causing" and "being involved in a process specified
elsewhere". It does not seem likely that the Schema generalizing over causative and
anaphoric or periphrastic doen has a high degree of salience, but such a Situation is not
at all uncommon.
More importantly in the present context, it is this kind of representation that allows
us to describe the gradual and asymmetric changes in the use of causative doen. At
lower levels in a network, the representation of a usage type is relatively rieh and
detailed. It is here that we would locate features such äs "authority" äs an aspect of
situations in which the use ofdoen is motivated, äs an instance of a more abstract, and
more inclusive feature "direct causation", which is located at a higher level in the
network. We can then naturally assume that this was a well-established, salient usage
type for people 300 years ago, but much less so for many members of the Community
today - where "language Community" and "cultural Community" are actually indis-
tinguishable. Thus the respective networks differ subtly, but they still have the same
general structure, and in fact also the same content at higher levels. That is, this
particular change may be represented äs the transition shown in Figure 3 (leaving out the
rest of the doen network).
15Cf. Geeraerts (1997:113), who views the combination of structural stability and flexible
adaptability äs major functional explanations for the (prototypical) network structure of semantic
categories. Without disagreeing, I think the usage-based conception goes beyond such a view in
that it allows one to see how the network structure actually arises out of universal features of
usage. In other words, starting from usage has greater explanatory power, äs the relevant aspects
of linguistic structure can be shown to be not only functional, but in fact "emergent": synchronic
links between senses of a word do indeed "coincide" with mechanisrns of change (Geeraerts
1997:6), precisely because changes arise out of regularities in usage (cf. Hopper and Traugott
1993:70-72, 87-93).
16The permissive use of loten overlaps with the network for let (or may even be identical to
it), but the complete network for loten, unlike the one for let, also includes coercive causation, and
has a top-level schematic meaning "indirect causation"; cf. Verhagen and Kemmer (1997).
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l by inanimatel
Figure 3. Chcmge in pari ofthe doen network
On the other band, "inanimate cause producing result in a person's mind" (äs used
in narratives) may have become a new, relatively salient subschema at a level below that
of the Schema for inanimate causation in general. More radical changes could be
envisaged äs the outcome of such gradual processes, of course. In particular, a continued
reduction ofthe salience ofthe subschema for animate-causers-as-authorities could in the
end conceivably result in its complete disappearance, first for some members of the
community, and then more - a development that might be reinforced by the increase of
well-established subschemas for causation by inanimate causes; that is, the present
Situation could develop into one where doen is a marker of inanimacy ofthe causer. The
present Situation in Dutch is not like that, and it is not really predictable how this will
actually develop; but the mechanism of such a development is clear: a decrease ofthe
salience of a subschema, ultimately resulting in its disappearance for all members ofthe
linguistic community, while other parts are extended and may become more salient. At
some point in the history of English, for example, something of this kind must have
happened when causative do became obsolete, while other parts ofthe entire do network
did not change essentially. That is to say that we can maintain, for example, that English
do and Dutch doen are "the same element", while still being able to explicate the
differences in usage.
In concluding, I would like to elaborate this last point in order to state explicitly one
consequence of this result for theoretical presuppositions about meaning. Usually we
think ofthe relation between meaning and usage, or meaning and Interpretation, in such
a way that meaning is something constant "in" usage, or "in" the message - an instance
of the famous CONDUlT-metaphor analysed by Reddy (1979). In other words, this
conception entails a view of meanings äs "building blocks" of interpretations, in which
meanings are in some way logically prior to usage. The usage-based view makes this
conception impossible: it is not the case that entire networks enter into the interpretation
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of instances of use.17 Instead, what it suggests is that by using a particular word a
Speaker or writer invites bis/her audience to find one or more aspects of the Situation that
fit some part, preferably a well-entrenched part, of the network associated with that
word, i.e. to assimilate it to the result of previous experiences with the word; the
meaning of a word is thus viewed äs a constraint on interpretations, rather than äs a part
of them (see Verhagen 1997 for general discussion).
This type of meta-theoretical conclusion may seem far removed from the specifics
of the use and the history of doen, but it is important to see that the connection is
actually quite tight: without such a theoretical position the description of the
development ofdoen reported in Section 3 of this paper would actually be inconsistent,
äs it would at the same time imply change of meaning and no change of meaning. More
generally, such a position seems a theoretical prerequisite for discussion of a topic, such
äs that of do/tunldoen in English, German and Dutch, that is simultaneously considered
coherent (in some sense these are the same element) and divergent: the same word is
definitely not used for exactly the same things at different times and different places.
"It is precisely for this reason, I think, that some linguists would tend to assign only the most
abstract Schema the Status of "meaning". But this has the undesirable effect that differences in
usage, for example those between English do and Dutch doen, become hard to describe, or are
viewed äs falling outside the scope of linguistics proper. Recognizing that it might be the building-
block-view that ultimately induces this idea may help in overcoming this tendency, while it is still
possible to hold on to the principle that one linguistic element normally has one meaning (now
conceived äs a network).
